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ABSTRACT
With the increased visibility of global surveillance systems (such as PRISM) to the public,
there have been growing calls for more resistance against surveillance. This article critically
engages with the options for resistance suggested by Gary T. Marx (2009), focusing on those
that  affect  the  social  and  material  circumstances  of  individuals,  and  ignoring  the  symbolic
ones. Through this, the role of technological momentum in global surveillance systems, and
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the  high  cost  of  resistance  for  individuals  are  highlighted.  I  argue  that  because  of  the
technological momentum and cost of resistance, many options for resistance are problematic
for individuals.
KEYWORDS
Analysis, global surveillance, individuals, technological momentum.
RESUMEN
Junto con  la creciente  visibilización  pública  de los  sistemas  de vigilancia  global  (como
PRISM), han ido apareciendo cada vez más llamamientos a la resistencia contra este tipo de
control.  Este artículo analiza críticamente las opciones de resistencia sugeridas por Gary T.
Marx (2009), centrándose en las que afectan a las circunstancias sociales y materiales de los
individuos, y dejando de lado las que tienen tan solo una dimensión simbólica.  A través de
este  texto  se  destacan  la  función  del  momentum tecnológico  en  los  sistemas  de  vigilancia
global y el elevado coste personal que las resistencia tiene para los individuos. Mi argumento
es que debido a estos dos elementos, muchas opciones de resistencia son problemáticas en la
dimensión individual. 
PALABRAS CLAVE
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RESUMO
Junto  com  a  crescente  visibilização  pública  dos  sistemas  de  vigilância  global  (como
PRISM),  têm aparecido  cada  vez  mais  chamados  à  resistência  contra  esta  vigilância.  Este
artigo  analisa  criticamente  as  opções  de  resistência  sugeridas  por  Gary  T.  Marx  (2009),
centrando-se nas que afetam as circunstâncias sociais e materiais dos indivíduos, e deixando
de lado as que têm tão somente uma dimensão simbólica. Através deste texto se destacam a
função do momentum tecnológico nos sistemas de vigilância global e o elevado custo pessoal
que as  resistências  têm para  os  indivíduos.  Meu argumento  é  que devido  a  estes  dois  ele -
mentos, muitas opções de resistência são problemáticas na dimensão individual.
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Introduction
Edward  Snowden  and  Wikileaks  have  recently  brought  discussion  on  surveillance  into  the
public arena, making startling revelations regarding the existence of global surveillance pro -
grams such as PRISM, a state run surveillance system (for more details see The Guardian,
2013). Global surveillance systems are not unusual in contemporary society, routinely used in
commerce, security, and communication (Lyon, 2001). These systems however have usually
avoided the headlines. With the increased visibility of PRISM and other global surveillance
systems, there have been many calls for greater resistance against surveillance.
In this article I critically engage with the idea of resistance, particularly options of resist -
ance available to individuals. Here resistance is conceptualised as those behaviours and actions
that seek to change the "dialectic of control" (Giddens, 1984, p. 16) around surveillance in
some way, shifting the balance of power between watcher and watched (Lyon, 2007). Of par-
ticular  interest  are  those  forms  of  resistance  that  directly  change  the  social  and  material
circumstances  of  data  collection.  Symbolic  or  passive  resistances  that  don't  make  these
changes are ignored.  I contend that many individual options for resistance are problematic.
Firstly,  because  the  technological  momentum  of  global  surveillance  systems  like  PRISM
makes direct and confrontational opposition difficult. Secondly, because the integration of sur-
veillance  systems  into  everyday  life  makes  their  disentanglement  costly  for  individuals.  I
conclude  that  individual  resistance in  its  current  state  is  problematic,  and a  broader  scope
maybe worth considering.
Momentum
The limitations of resistance stem from the asymmetry between surveillance structures and in-
dividual forms of resistance, and the accumulation of what Hughes (1994) calls “technological
momentum”  in  surveillance  systems.  Historian  of  technology  Thomas  Hughes  argued  that
technological systems could be thought of like moving physical objects, as gathering forward
momentum in their development and adoption (Kirkman, 2004). Momentum is accumulated
through forms of capital including favourable social and political networks, and economic re -
sources,  that are gathered as systems grow and develop.  Successful  socio-technical  systems
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were those that had a great deal of momentum, and therefore resources, behind them to reach
their desired goal (Hughes, 1986). Global surveillance can be understood in the same way, as
a socio-technical system with great resources invested to increase its momentum. This is clear
when the forms of capital involved in global surveillance are considered. This capital refers to
both material and economic resources but also social and cultural resources, as no technical
system is separate from social contexts (Latour, 2005). Global surveillance systems have been
found to have enormous amounts of resources invested. For example, the National Security
Agency's (NSA), the creators of PRISM, secret budget for 2013 was in excess of $15 Billion
(Braun, 2013). Alongside economic and material support, global surveillance programs were
built and justified upon a cultural and political environment (i.e. post 9/11) that was receptive
and even welcoming to security and surveillance measures (Monahan, 2010). Any single indi -
vidual  cannot  hope  to  muster  resources  to  combat  these  kinds  of  momentum  and,  as  a
consequence, individuals face an uphill battle to affect any meaningful resistance to surveil -
lance.  Monahan  (2006b)  argues  that  this  disjunction  between  individuals  and  surveillance
structures is one of the reasons why resistance occurs. While true, it ignores the implication of
technological momentum; that to make an actual change to an individual's surveillance con-
texts is to also challenge the momentum of the system.
Resistance Options
This is not to suggest that surveillance is a deterministic social phenomena. Surveillance pro -
cesses are always a consequence of "the context and comportment" (Marx, 2013, p. 5) of any
given social situation, with the outcomes of this situation never predetermined. As Gilliom
(2005)  notes  even  the most  marginalised  and  disadvantaged  members  of  society  can  offer
forms of resistance to surveillance, challenging the status quo. But the question is: do these ac-
tions  actually  change  the  balance  of  power  and  the  circumstances  of  surveillance  for
individuals? Marx (2003, 2009, p. 297) suggests twelve possible "surveillance neutralisation"
techniques for individuals to resist surveillance: 
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TABLE 1: TWELVE NEUTRALIZATION MOVES
Source: Marx, G.T (2009, p.298).
However, in suggesting these surveillance neutralisation devices, Marx (2009) also notes the
potential for methods of resistance to be overcome or nullified through appropriate counter -
measures taken by the surveillance system or authority. These countermeasures are a function
of the momentum of the surveillance system, as momentum dictates the available resources a
system has towards its interests.  It is for this reason that any individual act of resistance is
likely  to  be  easily  countered  by  global  surveillance  systems  –  individuals  simply  lack  the
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ability to confront and neutralise this momentum. Now consider Marx’s typology in this light.
His first method of resistance, discovering and raising awareness, is irrelevant as the details of
such surveillance systems are already available, and public awareness is at an all time high.
These  programs still  continue.  Methods  such  as  refusing  surveillance,  explaining  and  con-
testing  surveillance,  and  co-operating  with  surveillance  do  not  actively  seek  to  change  the
circumstances  or  vulnerabilities  of  the individual  to  data  collection and are  not  of  interest
here. This leaves a set of neutralisation techniques that focus on making changes to the indi -
vidual's circumstances, including avoiding or breaking surveillance devices, blocking access to
personal data, distorting data capture, switching the captured data, and piggy backing onto ac -
cepted or unwatched objects or measures. These behaviours represent confrontational forms of
resistance in that they directly challenge the socio-material forms of order that allow surveil -
lance  to  occur.  All  of  these  methods  are  possible  for  individuals.  Personal  data  may  be
encrypted to  prevent  access,  and the Internet  may be accessed through secure private  net-
works, or routed through services such as TOR that disrupt monitoring (See TOR 2014). This
achieves forms of blocking or masking. An individual may choose to enter false data volun-
tarily,  acting as a means of  distorting.  A user might access the Internet on someone else's
computer or use a friend’s phone, switching the data collected. Individuals are therefore not
without options.
But these options are easily countered by global surveillance systems. The technological
momentum, and therefore prior investment and development in global surveillance, means that
many of  the measures suggested have already been countered by those conducting surveil -
lance.  For  example,  many  standard  encryption  measures,  network  equipments,  and  digital
devices  have  vulnerabilities  which  state  authorities  are  often  aware  of  and  exploit  at  will
(Menn, 2013; Riley, 2014; Der Spiegel, 2013). When these approaches do not suffice, state
authorities have designed and constructed network infrastructure and hardware to allow direct
access to the fibre optic or copper lines themselves (Aron, 2013). Privacy services like TOR
have been penetrated by state security services and their encryption protocols broken (Goodin,
2013). Distortion and switching as a form of resistance are also misleading, as they ignore
how services like PRISM rely on databases of previously entered information in addition to
real time data collection. Entire datasets of personal information are already in the possession
of governments and private corporations already (Lyon, 2001). A sudden change in behaviour
or shift in the data collected in real time doesn't change prior knowledge, and the analytical
and comparative potential of these datasets persists. Data collected and circulated within these
databases is notoriously difficult to remove, and is often outside the awareness and means of
http://teknokultura.net Revista Teknokultura, (2014), Vol. 11 Núm. 2: 425-440
432 ISSN: 1549 2230
A Question of Momentum
Critical Reflections on Individual Options for Surveillance Resistance
Ashlin Lee
individuals themselves (Lyon, 2002). Finally in many cases those conducting surveillance have
enormous ranges of extra techniques for collecting personal information. Security organisa -
tions in the service of nation states and private companies have a range of covert and exotic
measures  for  data  collection  (Der  Spiegel,  2013),  and  consumer  level  surveillance  is  often
built into the many digital infrastructure, networks, and standards that consumers use (Prid-
more,  2012).  Companies  and  authorities  have  also  been  extraordinarily  successful  in
"seducing" users away from resistance to complicity (Lyon, 2007, p. 102). What this suggests
is that for individuals confrontational measures of resistance are limited, and that any mean-
ingful shift in the material realities of data collection is difficult.
The remaining  methods  of  resistance such  as  avoidance or  breaking surveillance infra-
structure also present a second problem, a high cost for individual users. While breaking or
avoiding surveillance systems are  highly  successful  means of  resistance that  are  difficult  to
counter,  to do these consistently  and effectively  means abandoning the use of  many socio-
technical processes that are taken for granted in everyday life in the developed West. I do not
suggest  that  the  nation-state  (through  PRISM or  similar  programs)  is  watching  your  every
move, but instead refer to the enormous variety of privately organised and routine surveillance
individuals  are  subject  to.  For  example,  data  collection  while  using  television  (Andrejevic,
2009) and social media (Trottier,  2012), consumer surveillance while shopping in locations
such  as  the  supermarket  (Coll,  2013),  targeted  advertising  and  marketing  (Campbell  &
Carlson, 2002), and continual forms of medical (French & Smith, 2013) and insurance sur -
veillance (Gandy, 1989). While it is easy to consider global surveillance as solely referring to
surveillance systems with a global scope (a la PRISM), this obscures the variety of surveil -
lance  practices  that  occur  globally.  Additionally,  many  of  these  systems  have  enormous
practical value, serving as a means to verify the identities of individual citizens, by matching
tokens of identity to recorded personal details (Lyon, 2001). Without these systems interna -
tional  travel  would  be  exceedingly  difficult,  global  commerce  and  financial  activities  using
ATMs or stock exchanges would not be processed (Lyon, 2001), and the provision of state so-
cial services such as health and education would be dramatically less efficient and far more
costly for individuals and the state (Wood, Ball, Lyon, Norris, & Raab, 2006). Also, although
mired in many ethical and social problems, global surveillance networks have contributed to -
wards  an  increase  in  security  for  some  nations  and  their  citizens  (King,  2013).  Resisting
surveillance through abandoning services or technologies that make individuals vulnerable is a
difficult  and personally costly means of resistance that I believe few citizens would actively
support,  as  the  non-use  of  technology  has  the  potential  for  marginalisation  (Warschauer,
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2004) and impairs functioning in everyday life (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003). Abandoning ob -
vious socio-technical vulnerabilities also does not protect against other surveillance practices
like bugging, and doesn't stop previous information about the individual being used.
An individual's options for resistance are therefore limited and problematic. The technolo-
gical  momentum of  global  surveillance  systems  means  individual  actions  of  resistance  are
limited and can be countered by surveillance organisers. Other forms of resistance are person-
ally costly for individuals given the entanglement of surveillance in everyday life. I make these
points not to suggest that acceptance or resignation are desirable alternatives, or that resistance
is not important, but to highlight an unfortunate reality of contemporary surveillance.
Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
Is resistance to global surveillance then pointless for an individual? Perhaps in some current
iterations,  but  that  does  not  mean  abandoning  resistance  is  helpful.  Global  surveillance
presents a pressing moral, legal, and social issue for all members of contemporary society. Ig -
noring  surveillance,  and  allowing  global  surveillance  regimes  to  go  unchallenged  and
unopposed perpetuates a growing asymmetry between those conducting surveillance and the
subject(s) of surveillance. It is therefore important that surveillance and its subsequent asym-
metries  do  not  go  unquestioned  or  unopposed,  whether  this  be  through  resistance  or
alternative  means.  But  any  suggested  opposition  to  surveillance,  especially  for  individuals,
needs to recognise the current context of surveillance, including issues of technological mo-
mentum and surveillance's role in everyday life, which complicates opposition.
Because of these points,  future discussion on resistance,  especially for individuals,  may
benefit from looking beyond confrontational resistance towards ideas more attuned to dealing
with the context. One possible angle for this might be considering ideas around how surveil -
lance can be controlled or engaged with, to facilitate a positive outcome for individuals. It is
unlikely global surveillance systems will be reversed or halted given the momentum developed
so far and the gains these systems have had for those in power. Additionally, this momentum
is set to continue to build as a new generation of technologies such as drones (Wall & Mon -
ahan, 2011), wearable devices (Whitson, 2013), and algorithmic and intelligent surveillance
(Introna & Wood, 2004), are developed and deployed. An individual can never hope to resist,
avoid, or destroy all these measures of surveillance. However if Marx's (2013) assertion that
surveillance holds no inherent moral character and is contextually determined holds true, then
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considering how individuals can engage with surveillance and determine its course could be a
good next step. Such an approach would sidestep the idea of confrontation as the basis for
resistance, avoiding problems of technological momentum, while acknowledging the role of
surveillance in everyday life. Positive change would occur through participation, engagement,
and control, instead of fighting, destroying, or hiding from surveillance. This is not an entirely
new  idea,  with  Mann  (2013)  suggesting  that  all  individuals  should  adopt  veillance (or
watching) technologies to address the current asymmetries of a  sur-veillance  society (where
watching occurs only from above).  He suggests  harnessing the technological  momentum of
surveillance to allow all individuals to watch each other and the authorities. Individual thus do
not  have  to  resist  surveillance when  they  are  able  to  conduct  their  own  veillance,  demon-
strating how participating and engaging might be positive for individuals. Through this Mann
believes that society "will  tend to be more balanced,  just,  prosperous and 'livable'"  (Mann,
2013, p. 11), in comparison to where there is sur-veillance only. However any such notion of
engagement or control would still need to overcome significant hurdles. While new generations
of devices, such as Google Glass, may offer a feasible platform for this, there is no guarantee
that uptake will be high enough to create a veillance society. All individuals need equal access
and opportunity to engage for a veillance society to work. As a social measure, it would also
require  a  supportive  legislative  and  political  environment,  a  difficult  proposition  given  that
governments and corporations benefit from the current asymmetries. It also begs the question
of how individuals would be able to generate enough momentum, whether this be technolo -
gical, social, political, or economic, to create and maintain such a radical social arrangement.
Consequently, this would mean a shift in focus from individual to group forms of particip -
ation and resistance. An obvious counterpoint to much of the above discussion is that it has
not  engaged  with  these  kinds  of  group  forms  of  resistance.  As  Martin,  van  Brakel,  and
Burnhard (2009) state resistance to surveillance is best understood as occurring in relation to
multiple actors and groups. It has been well demonstrated that it is possible for individual's to
come together in collectives or communities to resist or challenge surveillance in these con-
texts (see Monahan, 2006a). These facts and the necessity to consider groups in the analysis of
resistance is not in question, and indeed may offer individuals a way of engaging in resistance.
But this should not obscure the fact that surveillance occurs in a world that is increasingly in -
dividualised  and  fragmented  (Bauman,  2000)  especially  for  those  living  in  the  developed
West, and individual options for resistance should still be explored. This article has sought to
directly  engage with  this  notion and critique  it  without  at  all  devaluing or  detracting  from
group options for resistance. Surveillance must be considered as a part of the political eco-
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nomic patterns of society (Lyon, 2007), with individualisation existing as an important factor
in these patterns. With traditional forms of sociality and community evolving towards an indi -
vidually directed project (Bauman, 2000),  and surveillance being increasingly  ubiquitous to
these projects  (Lyon,  2001),  it  is  left  in  the individual's  hands how this  risk is  negotiated.
Therefore a consideration of the individual and their capacity to act is important and neces -
sary, as it compliments existing understandings of group resistance.
The  importance  of  having  options  for  enacting  positive  change  upon  surveillance  is
enormous, whether these options come from individuals or groups. But any such notion must
be pragmatic and open for development. It is hoped this article will encourage further discus -
sion in this vein, for the good of all the subjects under surveillance. 
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